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The aim of this paper is to point to the analogy between mathematical 
and physical thought experiments, and even more widely between the 
epistemic paths in both domains. Having accepted platonism as the un-
derlying ontology as long as the platonistic path in asserting the possi-
bility of gaining knowledge of abstract, mind-independent and causally 
inert objects, my widely taken goal is to show that there is no need to in-
sist on the uniformity of picture and monopoly of certain epistemic paths 
in the epistemic descriptive context. And secondly, to show the analogy 
with the ways we come to know the truths of (natural) sciences. 
Keywords: Thought experiment, epistemology, philosophy of math-
ematics, natural sciences, descriptive epistemic context.
1. Introduction
To endorse standard platonism in the philosophy of mathematics is 
not to be confi ned to platonic perception, as usually thought. In the 
same way, to defend other, non-standard, versions of platonism is not 
to be limited to some specifi c epistemic paths either. The aim of this 
paper is to show why this is the case and in which sense the plurality 
of epistemic paths in the domain of mathematics is analogous to the 
epistemic routes in the descriptive epistemic context given the domain 
of the natural sciences.
* Research for this paper was carried out under the project “Rationality: between 
Logically Ideal and Commonsensical in Everyday Reasoning”. The project is funded 
by the Croatian Science Foundation. IP-2016-06-2408.
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Standardly, platonism in epistemology is “the view that mathematics 
is about objects of which we have a priori knowledge”, where by “object” 
is meant a mind-independent entity. According to standard or Gödelean 
Platonism we gain mathematical knowledge via platonic perception.
Usually when the background philosophy, i.e. ontology is taken to 
be platonism, the epistemology is concentrated on the discussion about 
the existence of the platonic perception and those who endorse Pla-
tonism but not the Platonist perception, offer alternative epistemic 
routes, in order to avoid platonic intuition, taken to be a mysterious 
and unclear procedure of direct grasp of abstract objects. Given Bena-
cerraf’s argument against Platonism in epistemology, that is against 
the possibility of grasping truths concerning objective, abstract, non 
spatio-temporally located objects, other versions of platonism take 
other routes to have the epistemic monopoly (such as e.g. recarving in 
neo-Fregean platonism) or offer a variety of alternative routes to the 
platonistic intuition (e.g. ante rem structuralism).
In this paper the goal is to redirect the attention on two different 
points: the plurality of platonic epistemic paths and the analogy with 
the epistemic paths in the natural sciences.
I shall try fi rstly to show that there are more than one possible 
epistemic routes of gaining mathematical knowledge compatible with 
platonism (in the sense of grasping mathematical objects and their re-
lations). Secondly, my aim is to show how it is possible to dig up other 
epistemic routes without giving up on platonism and without giving up 
the mathematics-natural sciences analogy.
Within the domain of standard platonism, the idea is hence to both 
dethrone platonistic intuition and situate it amongst other epistemic 
routes, and to show the analogy with the way we gain knowledge in 
the natural sciences. The focus will be on experiments, in particular on 
thought experiments.
2. The historically oriented research
The development of mathematical knowledge as well as the process of 
discovery in the (natural) sciences could be standardly analysed from 
different perspective: if could be analysed within the cognitive science 
oriented research, or within the historical oriented research, o a com-
putationally oriented research, and so on.
In this paper I shall focus on the critical analysis of the mathemati-
cal descriptive epistemic paths as well as the epistemic mathematics-
natural sciences analogy through the prism of the historically oriented 
research.
Even though it might come as a surprise, given that platonism is 
here taken to be the underlying ontology, I take the accepted meth-
odology for epistemology of science and mathematics to be (Kitcher’s) 
pragmatic naturalism, in particular his view that we ought to look at 
the history in order to determine the epistemology since “history is the 
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teacher of epistemology” (italics mine). The underlying idea is hence 
that the epistemological route follows the historical one, and that “the 
epistemological order of mathematics broadly recapitulates the histori-
cal order.” Even though one of the tenets of pragmatic naturalism is the 
denial of a priori knowledge (in the domain of mathematics as much 
as elsewhere), here the idea is rather merely to dethrone platonistic 
intuition and situate it amongst other epistemic routes. And the justi-
fi cation for doing so comes from history itself, which offers reasons for 
endorsing platonist intuition as much as other epistemic modes and 
that thus ironically ends up as a turn-the-table for Platonism. The im-
portance of the historical analysis is threefold: it fi rstly justifi es the en-
dorsement of the platonic perception, secondly it justifi es the plurality 
of epistemic modes in gaining mathematical knowledge, and fi nally it 
justifi es the endorsement of the mathematics-natural sciences analogy.
When talking about different epistemic modes in grasping math-
ematical objects, the mathematics-science analogy it’s imposing itself 
to us and turns out to be particularly strong in such descriptive epis-
temic context. Let us have a look at such mathematics-science epis-
temic analogy in more details.
3. Three modes of epistemic access 
and the mathematics-(natural) sciences link.
I shall propose three main modes of initial epistemic access to both 
mathematical and scientifi c reality (objects and properties): (1) Percep-
tion: Visual and Platonic, (2) Experiment and (3) Introduction (or hypo-
thetical positing) and positing (or categorical positing) of objects.
The epistemological science-mathematics analogy turns out to be 
overall, each epistemic path in science having its counterpart in math-
ematics. The plenitude of such paths is (to be) determined and classi-
fi ed by looking at the history of science, that is mathematics.
Let us hence have a look at the mentioned epistemic paths in the 
given order.
(1) Perception: Visual and Platonic
In scientifi c research, one epistemic way is sensory, primarily visual, 
direct perception of objects and phenomena. The analogy in mathemat-
ics would be the platonic/”pi in the sky”, direct access to the mathemati-
cal objects and statements, often called platonic perception/intuition. 
When talking about it, J. R. Brown points out:
The main idea is that we have a kind of access to the mathematical realm 
that is something like our perceptual access to the physical realm. This 
doesn’t mean that we have direct access to everything: the mathematical 
realm may be like the physical where we see some things, such as white 
streaks in bubble chambers, but we don’t see others, such as positrons. 
(Brown 1999: 13)
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The platonic intuition—visual perception analogy is something stan-
dard platonists traditionally heavily insist on. Brown says:
Just as the mathematical mind can grasp (some) abstract sets, so the sci-
entifi c mind can grasp (some of) the abstract entities which are the laws of 
nature. (Brown 1991)
Gödel in particular famously insists on the analogy while saying that
the assumption of such objects is quite as legitimate as the assumption pf 
physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to believe in their exis-
tence. They are in the same sense necessary to obtain a satisfactory system 
of mathematics as physical bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of 
our sense perceptions. (Gödel 1944: 456f)
and, in one of the most famous quotations in the philosophy of math-
ematics, that
despite their remoteness form sense experience, we do have something like 
a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that 
the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don’t see any reason 
why we should have any less confi dence in this kind of perception, i.e. math-
ematical intuition, than is sense perception. (Gödel 1947: 484)
Such an analogy has been criticised by many, and for several reasons. 
Apart from being unnatural and forced, the analogy seems to take the 
existence of the platonic perception for granted while in effect it is most 
contentious. It hence has been heavily criticised by both platonism’s 
friend and foes. Kitcher remarks that 
…what some mathematicians call “intuition” or even (in the case of Ra-
manujan) the visitation of the goddess (Namakiri), can be explained as ‘fi ne-
tuned abilities […] rooted in extant mathematical practice. (Kitcher 2011)
While Shapiro, who is endorsing ante rem structuralism (a version of 
non-standard platonism) follows the same line as Kitcher’s when un-
derlying that
…the axioms do not force themselves on a fi rst (or second, or third) reading. 
For virtually any branch of mathematics, the psychological necessity of the 
axioms and inferences, and the feeling that the axioms are natural and in-
evitable, comes only at the end of a process of training in which the student 
acquires considerable practice working within the given system, under the 
guidance of teachers. (Shapiro 1997: 212)
How to respond to such criticisms?
The main point to be underlined is that mathematical intuitions 
are not just theoretical presuppositions of the philosophers of math-
ematics but are being asserted by working mathematicians themselves 
(Cantor, Gödel, Ramanujan, Hardy etc.). We hence have good reasons 
to transpose this fact from the history of mathematics, right into the 
core of our epistemology. Kitcher’s main point being that what is ex-
plained as platonic perception could easily be explained by invoking 
the mathematicians’ “fi ne-tuned abilities” that are “rooted in extant 
mathematical practice”, instead of being some mysterious faculty of 
the mind. Wanting to have a closer look at Kitcher’s remark, and to 
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see what such “fi ne-tuned abilities” wold amount to, we are to face a 
dilemma. Namely, if what is meant by “fi ne-tuned” is just the perfect 
conformity to the extant practice in the profession, it is diffi cult to see 
how Gödel’s non-conformistic example, not to speak about Ramanujan, 
would fi t in the picture. If, on the other hand, fi ne-tuning refers to an 
impressive ability to reach the truth beyond the extant research para-
digm, then it certainly is compatible with the platonistic account on 
which such a fi ne-tuning (to the mathematical reality) might culminate 
in intuitive insights.
(2) (Thought) Experiment
Experiments have been usually perceived as the lynchpin of empiri-
cal sciences, a method for discovering the facts of nature and hence as 
belonging to the sphere of practical research. Mathematics being an 
armchair activity—how can the mathematical domain be related to any 
experimental epistemic route?
I am using the entry from Stanford Encyclopedia to provide a main-
stream characterisation of the role of experiment:
Physics, and natural science in general, is a reasonable enterprise based 
on valid experimental evidence, criticism, and rational discussion. It pro-
vides us with knowledge of the physical world, and it is experiment that 
provides the evidence that grounds this knowledge. […] It can also call for 
a new theory, either by showing that an accepted theory is incorrect, or by 
exhibiting a new phenomenon that is in need of explanation. Experiment 
can provide […] evidence for the existence of the entities involved in our 
theories. Finally, it may also have a life of its own, independent of theory. 
Scientists may investigate a phenomenon just because it looks interesting. 
Such experiments may provide evidence for a future theory to explain. […] 
a single experiment may play several of these roles at once. (Franklin and 
Perovic 2016)
The standard taxonomy, when talking about experiments, includes the 
distinction between confi rmatory (or demonstrative) on one hand and 
the exploratory experiments on the other. The former having the goal 
of testing theories, while the latter has as the primary goal the experi-
mentation that is not guided by hypotheses but it rather a process or 
searching.
My aim, at this point, is to show that, no matter which of the two 
main sub-species of the experiment we prefer to concentrate on, either 
the confi rmatory or the exploratory (non-demonstrative) one, the anal-
ogy with the mathematical case holds throughout.
If talking about the confi rmatory experiments, there are examples 
from the mathematical practice that could be treated as examples of 
such experiments. Let us here mention the proof that number π is ir-
rational. The number π has been studied for centuries (since ancient 
time) and so was the notion of irrational numbers. Aryabhata appar-
ently hinted at number π being irrational in 500 CE. Such an outcome 
was accepted as a new mathematical result not prior to the 18th cen-
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tury when Lambert (in 1761) proved it to be irrational. And then again, 
in the same paper in which he proved π’s being irrational, Lambert 
conjectured that number π is transcendental too, which was accepted 
in mathematics in 1882, when proved by Lindemann.
Other mathematical results and proofs are analogous to the explor-
atory, non-demonstrative experiments. In such experiments the exper-
imentation is not guided by hypotheses. An example in mathematics 
could be the problem of trisection of an arbitrary angle. The attempts to 
solve the problem, can be seen as an exploratory experiment that had 
been going on for centuries.
Notwithstanding the mentioned mathematical examples, when 
comparing the experiments in science with those in mathematics, we 
might still fi nd the proposed analogy implausible. And basically for two 
reasons: (a) experiments in science are practical procedures, done in 
laboratories, unlike in the mathematical domain, and (b) if anything, 
given the possibility to directly intervene on the objects in scientifi c ex-
periments, which is not possible in the mathematical domain given the 
abstract nature of mathematical objects (and hence their being caus-
ally inert). Let us have a closed look at the possible replies at the two 
just-mentioned reasons.
(a) Experiments in science are practical procedures, done in labo-
ratories, unlike those in the mathematical domain. Well, ought experi-
ments to be practical in the fi rst place? When thinking about, e.g. hight 
school experimentation, than we all have in mind the paradigmatic 
example of the laboratory and the practical procedures that we were 
performing there during the natural-sciences classes. The taxonomy 
however includes three types pf experiments: the real, the imaginary 
and the thought experiments. The real ones are those that have been 
performed, the imaginary are those that haven’t been formed but could 
have been, while the thought experiments are those that those that 
could not be performed due to the lack of technology or because impos-
sible in principle.
And when we look at the way experiments have been perceived by 
scientists through history, there is no uniformity of picture; not even a 
general agreement on experiments being real-world, practical methods 
for acquiring knowledge. Even in Galileo’s writings the distinction be-
tween real and imaginary experiments is not a sharp one and it is, for 
some experiments, a contentious issue. Newton’s bucket experiment is 
another example of an experiment that was originally an imaginary 
experiment but needn’t be. What about thought experiments? Such ex-
periments apparently played a major role in the development of scien-
tifi c theories in the work of Galileo, Newton, Einstein, Heisenberg. Ex-
amples are legion: Galileo’s experiment with the result that all bodies 
fall at the same speed, Schrödinger’s cat, Maxwell’s demon, Einstein 
chasing a light beam, Twin paradox and others.
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Still—and here we shall focus on the above remark (b)—what hap-
pens in experimental science might seem at fi rst sight to be remote 
from the standard mathematical practice.
If anything given the abstract nature of mathematical objects, i.e. 
the fact that they are not spatio-temporally located and are causally 
inert. Any intervention/manipulation on the objects of the domain fails 
to be possible in the case of mathematical experiments, and on abstract 
objects involved. So, while we can, to take the morally controversial 
example of tissue engineering—the Vacanti mouse, implant under the 
skin of a mouse a cartilage structure (and then the cartilage natural-
ly grows by itself), is not clear what the counterpart of such a direct 
manipulation of objects in the case of mathematical experiment would 
amount to.
Could we, fi guratively speaking, have a Vacanti number or a Va-
canti geometric fi gure? Certainly not! Should we (again) infer from 
that that the analogy is, to put it blandly, farfetched and artifi cially 
imposed? Not so fast.
Namely, it is diffi cult to guess in which way we literally manipu-
late (concrete) objects in thought experiments. We actually do not. We 
can hence talk about experiments without presupposing any kind of 
direct manipulation of concrete objects. Let take the example of one of 
the most famous thought experiments: “Maxwell’s demon”. According 
to the Second law of thermodynamics, in any change of state entropy 
must remain the same or increase; it cannot decrease. In laymen’s 
terms, heat cannot pass from a cold to a hot body. Maxwell’s goal in 
the experiment is to show that the Law is to be read in probabilistic 
terms. which means that, in principle, it could be possible for the heat 
to pass from a hot body to a colder one. I order to show how this could 
be possible, Maxwell imagine to have two connected boxes, which the 
Devil at the door that connect those two boxes (see picture). The two 
boxes contain some gas, and in particular the gas in the left box is hot, 
while the gas in the right box is cold. What is to be expected, according 
to the Second law of thermodynamic, is for the heat to pass from the hot 
gas to the cold one. But, during the experiment, the Demon decides to 
let the fast molecules from the cold box into the hot box, and the slow 
molecules from the hot box into the cold one. By letting the fast mol-
ecules from the cold box into the hot box, and the slow molecules from 
the hot box into the cold one, there will be an increase in the average 
speed in the hot box and a decrease in the average speed of molecules 
in the cold. Since, on Maxwell’s theory, heat is just an average speed 
of the molecules, there has been a fl ow of heat from the cold box to 
the hot one—contrary to what is expected according to the Second law 
of thermodynamic. Hence, the Law—and that is precisely Maxwell’s 
point—has to be interpreted probabilistically.
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Maxwell’s demon experiment.
Illustrated by Maja Grčki.
Let us further focus on some aspects of the analogy and the meeting 
points between the thought experiments in the natural sciences and 
some of the basic mathematical procedures. We shall analyse in more 
details the process of representations of abstract objects and the same-
ness of structure of some thought experiments in science with the re-
duction ad absurdum structure in mathematical proofs.
Let us start with some properties that the representations of ab-
stract objects share both in the natural sciences and in mathematics.
The non-concrete objects which we (mentally) “manipulate” during 
imaginary or thought experiments are often related to their spatio-
temporally counterparts. And the way these two kinds of objects are 
related might be analogous to the way in which representations of ab-
stract objects—the subject of manipulations in mathematical experi-
ments—are related to the abstract (mathematical) objects, i.e. their ab-
stract counterparts. In the case of the trisection of an arbitrary angle, 
we do manipulate the representation of an abstract geometrical entity. 
Thought experiments in the natural sciences can also share the 
same structure of standard proof methods in logic and mathemat-
ics. Let us take the example of Stevin’s thought experiment. As well 
known, there are three possible planes: the horizontal, the vertical and 
the inclined plane. If we put a weight on each of these planes than we 
already know that on the horizontal plane the weight remains at rest, 
while on the vertical plane the wight freely falls. What about the in-
clined plane? What happens with a weight if put on an inclined plane?
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Suppose we have a chain with weights and we put it on an inclined 
plane (picture (a)). How does the chain move? Well, there are obviously 
three possible answers:
(1) it remains at rest (in so called static equilibrium)
(2) it moves to the left
(3) it moves to the right.
The right answer is (1), it remains at rest. The next step is to prove it!
Let us suppose not–(1) (notice the reduction ad absurdum structure 
of the proof!)
If not–(1), it means that the force of the left is not balanced by the 
force in the right. Let us now add the links at the bottom so to get a 
closed look (picture (b))
If not–(1) were the case, the look would rotate and hence, we would get 
a perpetuum mobile, which is impossible. Hence, the chain remains at 
rest.
The analogy is better presented in the following table:
Thought experiments in science as (quasi) RAA (reduc  o ad 
absurdum) proofs
example: Stevin’s thought experiment
RAA proving method structure of Stevin’s thought experiment
A—the statement that we want to 
prove A—the chain remains at rest
suppose not-A suppose the chain does not remain at rest (not-A)
not-A leads to contradic  on
if the chain moved (if not-A), we 
would then have a perpetuum 
mobile—impossible!
hence, A hence, the chain remains at rest (A)
Table showing Stevin’s thought experiment having 
the structure of the reductio ad absurdum deduction rule
Why the “quasi” in the “Thought experiments in science as (quasi) RAA 
(reductio ad absurdum) proofs” title? Well, the reduction ad absurdum 
method of deduction require the initial hypnoses to lead to absurdum, 
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which means to (logical) contradiction, i.e. to a statement of the form A 
and not-A. Technically, a perpetuum mobile is not a logical impossibility 
but a nomic one. Hence it is not a (logical) absurdum. However, the idea 
is here that Stevin’s proof and any reductio ad absurdum one (in logic or 
mathematics) do share the same structure (see the above table).
The natural science-mathematics analogy, rather surprisingly, 
holds even if we decide to concentrate on real experiments in science 
instead of imaginary and thought ones. Such experiments are, in fact, 
in many aspects similar to some examples of manipulative procedures/
proofs in mathematics. Let us have a look at two examples.
The mathematical one is Lakatos’ historical proof case, while the one 
in the natural sciences is Hooke’s observations made with microscope. 
We easily notice the same dynamic language used in both cases, that is 
in both domains. (See the table below.)
Mathema  cs domain
Lakatos’ historical proof case 
V–E+F=2, for any polyhedron
Natural sciences domain
Hooke’s observa  ons made with 
microscope discovery of cells
Dynamic language Dynamic language
– take an arbitrary polyhedron – take a small piece of e.g. onion
– remove one of the faces – remove (peel off ) the membrane
– stretch the remaining fi gure out 
   on fl at surface
– stretch the part you want to 
   analyse on a glass
– remove the lines one at the 
    me, etc.
– add a few drops of water 
   or solu  on, etc.
My conclusion at this point would be that there is a strong analogy be-
tween the experiment in science and some of the central procedures in 
mathematics. However, experiments in science and mathematics repre-
sent just one possible epistemic path in gaining knowledge. Another one 
is the positing of objects, which can be either hypothetical or categorical.
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(3) Introduction (or hypothetical positing) 
and positing (or categorical positing) of objects
In science and mathematics there are objects that we introduce in our 
theories in order to make the overall theory complete and/or to explain 
the appearance of discrepancies, And there again, the mathematics-
science analogy enters the picture.
An example in science might be the discovery of the existence of the 
planet Neptune. After the discovery of Uranus, it was noticed that its or-
bit was not as it should be in accordance with Newton’s laws, which led 
the astronomers to the assumptions that a (still to be discovered) planet 
might be the cause of the discrepancy. Astronomers hence predicted the 
position of an unobserved planet perturbing the orbit of Uranus.
In mathematics a nice example of introducing objects is the one 
concerning the methods of solution of the quadratic and cubic equa-
tions. Negative square roots appeared in Cardano’s Ars Magna (1545) 
that contains the fi rst occurrence of complex numbers. Cardano in-
troduced negative square roots as solutions of the quadratic equation 
x2–10x+40=0. Since it was evident that solving the equation was impos-
sible (in ℝ), Cardano decided to formally introduce the negative square 
roots. As the existence of the planet Neptune was fi rst predicted by 
mathematical calculations and then empirically detected, i.e. seen 
by a telescope which gave the prediction the ontological force, analo-
gously the complex numbers were fi rst introduced formally and then, 
300 years later, a more specifying meaning was attached to them. The 
strategy of introducing planets in the astronomy case corresponds to 
the formal introduction of complex numbers in the mathematical case. 
Similarly, in the following step, the astronomers pass from the hypo-
thetical assumption to the categorical claim concerning the existence 
of the planet, while in the mathematical case, the analogous step goes 
from the formal introduction of negative square roots to the full-blown 
positing of new, complex numbers.
4. The mathematics-natural sciences analogy. 
More aspects concerning the underlying logic
One possible reaction at this point might be: when talking about the 
mathematics—natural sciences analogy, is there an insurmountable 
difference in methodology? Possible complaint: the reasons for assert-
ing the analogy between mathematics and the natural sciences in the 
descriptive epistemic context are marginal. Namely, there is a (much 
more) essential parameter that should be taken into consideration and 
that might make the difference between the epistemic paths in maths 
and the natural sciences come to surface: the underlying methodology.
When referring to the underling methodology, i.e. logic, the stan-
dard view is that in maths, unlike the natural sciences, the basic 
methodology is the axiomatic-deductive method (of the geometric tra-
dition). Contrary to that, in the natural sciences, the logic underlying 
34 M. Trobok, The Mathematics-Natural Sciences Analogy
the research is primarily inductive/abductive. It implies that the two 
domains are profoundly methodologically different given the difference 
at the core, that is at their underlying logic. To that remarks, I fi nd the 
most plausible reply to be the following one.
Proofs/theorem/theories at the fi nal stage (textbook) do not coin-
cide with the heuristics (in the sense of the epistemic paths within the 
context of discovery). The structure of the polished theory and the un-
derlying deductive system do not however correspond to the research 
process in the epistemic descriptive context.
Lakatos nicely underlines the difference between the historical 
development of mathematical results and the procedures we fi nd in 
mathematics textbooks. Such a difference amounts to the difference 
between the preformal development (correlates to the context of dis-
covery, i.e. the epistemic descriptive context we’ve been focused) on and 
the formal articulation (corresponding to the context of justifi cation) of 
a branch of mathematics by offering reasons for asserting that prefor-
mal proofs are not simply drafts of the formal ones but rather heuristic 
explanatory and exploratory tools having a development on their own. 
A very simple yet illuminating example is the one Pólya presents in 
his How to Solve It (Pólya 1945: 114–117). Let us have a closer look at 
it. And let us start by supposing that a mathematician is helping their 
child to write the homework in mathematics, and at some point the 
child is supposed to calculate 1+8+27+64 and solve it rightly by writing 
the result: 100. While waiting for the child to solve the exercise, the 
parent/mathematician notices that all four of the numbers/addends are 
cubs while the result (100) is a square. So that it is possible to write 
the mentioned equation in the form: 13+23+33+43=102. He also notices 
that the mentioned sum is the sum of the cubes of the fi rst four natural 
numbers. And then ask himself if it is a coincidence or it is not an iso-
lated case to have the sum of the cubes of the fi rst n natural numbers 
to be equal to a square. Pólya comments such a situation by comparing 
the parent/mathematician with the naturalist:
In asking this,1 we are like the naturalist who, impressed by a curious plant 
or a curious geological formation, conceives a general question. Our general 
question concerns with the sum of successive cubes 13+23+33+43+…+n3. We 
were led to it by the “particular instance” n=4. (Pólya 1945: 115)
How would the mathematician procede at this point? What would he 
do? Pólya’s answer is that the mathematician would do what the natu-







1 Pólya here refers to the question as to whether it is a coincidence or a general 
rule that the sum of the cubes of the fi rst n natural numbers is equal to a square.
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The mathematician might subsequently notice that the results on the 
right side of the equations, i.e. the squares, follow a regularity, a cer-







Interestingly enough, the sum of the cubes of the fi rst n natural num-
bers is equal to the square of the sum of the fi rst n natural numbers. 
Given that this regularity seems to be general too, the assertion fi nally 
obtains the form:
13+23+3+…+n3 = (1+2+3+…+n)2
This initial procedure, as pointed out by Pólya, is based on observation 
and induction and as such corresponds to the procedures of investiga-
tion in the natural sciences where the naturalist “may also reexamine 
the facts whose observation has led him to his conjecture; he compares 
them carefully, he tries to disentangle some deeper regularity, some 
further analogy” (Pólya 1945: 116).
In mathematics as in the physical sciences we may use observation and 
induction to discover general laws. But there is a difference. In the physical 
sciences, there is no higher authority than observation and induction but in 
mathematics there is such an authority: rigorous proof. (Pólya 1945: 117)
The difference Pólya is referring to is however beyond the scope of this 
article. This idea of the mathematics-natural sciences analogy is meant 
to be confi ned to the epistemic descriptive context, while the disanal-
ogy enters the picture in the context of justifi cation, which I am not 
addressing in this paper.
To summarise, in this paper I have taken the underlying ontology 
to be a version of standard platonism. I choose not to refrain from en-
dorsing the platonic perception as one of the possible epistemic paths 
and hence from endorsing a version of standard platonism since I have 
hopefully showed that platonic perception is not to he banned from the 
epistemology of mathematics domain given that we do have good rea-
sons for endorsing it.
I have then argued that, in the domain of mathematical entities and 
within the descriptive epistemic context, there is however a plurality 
of platonic epistemic paths and that such paths in the mathematical 
domain are analogous to the epistemic paths in the natural sciences.
Last but not least, I analysed the mathematics vs. natural sciences 
analogy from the perspective of the underlying logic. I have claimed the 
importance of keeping in mind the distinction between the context for 
discovery and the one of justifi cation. The former being correlated with 
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the so called preformal development of statements or theories in math-
ematics, while the latter being connected with the formal articulation 
of branches of mathematics. When concentrating on the mathematics-
natural sciences analogy and the underlying logic, it is important to 
take into consideration that the analogy holds in the context of discov-
ery, in which the preformal development plays the major role. Such a 
development is based, both in mathematics and in the natural sciences, 
mostly on induction. It is certainly true that in mathematics the basic 
logical apparatus is deduction and mathematical induction (and that 
differs from the logical apparatus used in the natural sciences). It is 
however crucial to take into account that the logical apparatus based 
on deduction enters the picture not before we take into account the con-
text of justifi cation. The context of justifi cation, however, being outside 
the scope of this paper.
Hence—to conclude—if the claims about analogy hold ground and 
I hope that they do, they vindicate both a pluralist view on the episte-
mology of mathematics and a thorough analogy between the epistemic 
paths in mathematics and in the natural sciences (given the descriptive 
epistemic context). Given that the underlying ontology is taken to be 
(a version of standard) Platonism, the presented mathematics-science 
epistemic analogy will hopefully offer a new perspective in the platonis-
tic epistemology debate.
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